etcdctl

etcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to versions 3.4.42, 3.5.28, and 3.6.9, unauthorized users may bypass authentication or authorization checks and call certain etcd functions in clusters that expose the gRPC API to untrusted or partially trusted clients. In unpatched etcd clusters with etcd auth enabled, unauthorized users are able to call MemberList and learn cluster topology, including member IDs and advertised endpoints; call Alarm, which can be abused for operational disruption or denial of service; use Lease APIs, interfering with TTL-based keys and lease ownership; and/or trigger compaction, permanently removing historical revisions and disrupting watch, audit, and recovery workflows. Kubernetes does not rely on etcd’s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected. Versions 3.4.42, 3.5.28, and 3.6.9 contain a patch. If upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected RPCs as unauthenticated in practice. Restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect and/or require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate distribution.

etcd: `tlsListener.acceptLoop` spawns unbounded handshake goroutines with no deadline

etcd: Authorization bypasses in multiple APIs

etcd: Watch API authorization bypass via open-ended range requests

etcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to 3.5.32 and 3.6.13, when etcd is configured with --listen-client-http-urls to split HTTP and gRPC client endpoints onto separate listeners, the --client-crl-file Certificate Revocation List is not enforced on the gRPC listener, allowing a client with a revoked certificate to authenticate successfully over gRPC. This issue is fixed in versions 3.5.32 and 3.6.13.

etcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to versions 3.4.42, 3.5.28, and 3.6.9, an authenticated user with RBAC restricted permissions on key ranges can use nested transactions to bypass all key-level authorization. This allows any authenticated user with direct access to etcd to effectively ignore all key range restrictions, accessing the entire etcd data store. Kubernetes does not rely on etcd’s built-in authentication and authorization. Instead, the API server handles authentication and authorization itself, so typical Kubernetes deployments are not affected. Versions 3.4.42, 3.5.28, and 3.6.9 contain a patch. If upgrading is not immediately possible, reduce exposure by treating the affected RPCs as unauthenticated in practice. Restrict network access to etcd server ports so only trusted components can connect and require strong client identity at the transport layer, such as mTLS with tightly scoped client certificate distribution.

etcd is a distributed key-value store for the data of a distributed system. Prior to 3.4.44, 3.5.30, and 3.6.11, a vulnerability in etcd allows read access via PrevKv, or lease attachment in Put requests within transaction operations, to bypass RBAC authorization checks. An authenticated user without sufficient read or lease-related permissions may be able to access unauthorized data or attach leases by invoking transaction operations with these features enabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.4.44, 3.5.30, and 3.6.11.

etcd: Nested etcd transactions bypass RBAC authorization checks

etcd RBAC bypass allows unauthorized data access via PrevKv/lease attachment in nested transaction Put requests

Etcd Gateway TLS endpoint validation only confirms TCP reachability in go.etcd.io/etcd

Etcd embed auto compaction retention negative value causing a compaction loop or a crash in go.etcd.io/etcd

Etcd auth Inaccurate logging of authentication attempts for users with CN-based auth only in go.etcd.io/etcd

Authorization bypasses in multiple APIs in go.etcd.io/etcd

Nested etcd transactions bypass RBAC authorization checks in go.etcd.io/etcd