kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/srpt: Fix srpt_alloc_rw_ctxs() unwind counters When srpt_alloc_rw_ctxs() fails partway through a multi-buffer indirect descriptor, the unwind path destroys RDMA contexts but leaves stale n_rw_ctx and n_rdma values (and a dangling rw_ctxs pointer). Later sq_wr_avail accounting in srpt_queue_response() or srpt_write_pending() can then subtract the wrong number of send queue credits. Reset the counters and clear rw_ctxs after freeing the heap allocation before returning an error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ti: icssg-prueth: fix use-after-free of CPPI descriptor in RX path cppi5_hdesc_get_psdata() returns a pointer into the CPPI descriptor. In both emac_rx_packet() and emac_rx_packet_zc(), the descriptor is freed via k3_cppi_desc_pool_free() before the psdata pointer is used by emac_rx_timestamp(), which dereferences psdata[0] and psdata[1]. This constitutes a use-after-free on every received packet that goes through the timestamp path. Defer the descriptor free until after all accesses through the psdata pointer are complete. For emac_rx_packet(), move the free into the requeue label so both early-exit and success paths free the descriptor after all accesses are done. For emac_rx_packet_zc(), move the free to the end of the loop body after emac_dispatch_skb_zc() (which calls emac_rx_timestamp()) has returned.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: call ->free_folio() directly in folio_unmap_invalidate() We can only call filemap_free_folio() if we have a reference to (or hold a lock on) the mapping. Otherwise, we've already removed the folio from the mapping so it no longer pins the mapping and the mapping can be removed, causing a use-after-free when accessing mapping->a_ops. Follow the same pattern as __remove_mapping() and load the free_folio function pointer before dropping the lock on the mapping. That lets us make filemap_free_folio() static as this was the only caller outside filemap.c.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Completely fix fcport double free In qla24xx_els_dcmd_iocb() sp->free is set to qla2x00_els_dcmd_sp_free(). When an error happens, this function is called by qla2x00_sp_release(), when kref_put() releases the first and the last reference. qla2x00_els_dcmd_sp_free() frees fcport by calling qla2x00_free_fcport(). Doing it one more time after kref_put() is a bad idea.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Add preempt_{disable,enable}_nested() in reqsk_queue_hash_req(). syzbot reported a weird reqsk->rsk_refcnt underflow in __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). The captured reqsk_put() in __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() is called only when it successfully removes reqsk from ehash. Moreover, reqsk_timer_handler() calls another reqsk_put() after that. This indicates that the reqsk was missing both refcnts for ehash and the timer itself. Since all the syzbot reports had PREEMPT_RT enabled, the only possible scenario is that reqsk_queue_hash_req() is preempted after mod_timer() and before refcount_set(), and then the timer triggered after 1s aborts the reqsk due to its listener's close(). Let's wrap mod_timer() and refcount_set() with preempt_disable_nested() and preempt_enable_nested(). Note that inet_ehash_insert() holds the normal spin_lock() (mutex in PREEMPT_RT), so it must be called outside of preempt_disable_nested(), but this is fine. The lookup path just ignores 0 sk_refcnt entries in ehash and tries to create another reqsk, but this will fail at inet_ehash_insert(). [0]: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x110 lib/refcount.c:28, CPU#0: ktimers/0/16 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ktimers/0 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x110 lib/refcount.c:28 Code: e4 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 38 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d e1 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 25 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d de 7d d1 0a <67> 48 0f b9 3a eb 24 e8 12 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d db 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f RSP: 0000:ffffc90000157948 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff84a1301b RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffff88801ca98000 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f72ae00 RBP: ffffffff99ae3b01 R08: ffff88801ca98000 R09: 0000000000000005 R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880425ef568 R13: ffff8880425ef4f8 R14: ffff8880425ef578 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126386000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7b46710e9c CR3: 000000000dbb6000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:400 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:432 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:450 [inline] reqsk_put include/net/request_sock.h:136 [inline] __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop+0x3ce/0x440 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1007 reqsk_timer_handler+0x651/0xdf0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1137 call_timer_fn+0x192/0x5e0 kernel/time/timer.c:1748 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1799 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2374 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x6a3/0x9f0 kernel/time/timer.c:2386 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2395 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x67/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2403 handle_softirqs+0x1de/0x6d0 kernel/softirq.c:622 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] run_ktimerd+0x69/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:1151 smpboot_thread_fn+0x541/0xa50 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix missing barriers when accessing stream->subrequests locklessly The list of subrequests attached to stream->subrequests is accessed without locks by netfs_collect_read_results() and netfs_collect_write_results(), and then they access subreq->flags without taking a barrier after getting the subreq pointer from the list. Relatedly, the functions that build the list don't use any sort of write barrier when constructing the list to make sure that the NETFS_SREQ_IN_PROGRESS flag is perceived to be set first if no lock is taken. Fix this by: (1) Add a new list_add_tail_release() function that uses a release barrier to set the pointer to the new member of the list. (2) Add a new list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() function that uses an acquire barrier to read the pointer to the first member in a list (or return NULL). (3) Use list_add_tail_release() when adding a subreq to ->subrequests. (4) Use list_first_entry_or_null_acquire() when initially accessing the front of the list (when an item is removed, the pointer to the new front iterm is obtained under the same lock).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix missing locking around retry adding new subreqs Fix netfs_retry_read_subrequests() and netfs_retry_write_stream() to take the appropriate lock when adding extra subrequests into stream->subrequests.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix potential for tearing in ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point Fix potential tearing in using ->remote_i_size and ->zero_point by copying i_size_read() and i_size_write() and using the same seqcount as for i_size. We need to make sure that netfslib and the filesystems that use it always hold i_lock whilst updating any of the sizes to prevent i_size_seqcount from getting corrupted.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.

libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()

libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE

ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests

net: mana: Sync page pool RX frags for CPU

net/liquidio: drop cached VF pci_dev LUT

netfs: Fix barriering when walking subrequest list

fs/ntfs3: call _ntfs_bad_inode() when failing to rename

net: serialize netif_running() check in enqueue_to_backlog()

RDMA/irdma: Replace waitqueue and flag with completion

RDMA/bnxt_re: Proper rollback if the ioremap fails

bnxt: fix head underflow on XDP head-grow

ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read

vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()

vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls

vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()

veth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP

um: vector: fix use-after-free in vector_mmsg_rx()

net: bridge: stop fast-leave after deleting a port group

net/smc: fix socket use-after-free during link group termination

igbvf: Fix leak in TX DMA error cleanup

KVM: x86: Cancel delayed I/O APIC EOI handling before destroying vCPUs

ksmbd: use memcmp() to compare ClientGUIDs

rtase: fix double free of multi-frag skb on DMA map failure

scsi: libiscsi_tcp: Bound SCSI Response data segment to the connection buffer

KVM: arm64: vgic: Fix race between LPI release and re-registration

netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: widen NAT rewrite delta to s32 in sip_help_tcp()

iommu/arm-smmu-v3-iommufd: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vDEVICE

net: ipv6: clear suppressed fib6 rule result

sctp: clear new_transport when removing a peer

sctp: fix use-after-free of cached ASCONF chunk

sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on

mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio() restore index before retrying

ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6ip6_err()

smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_try_adding_channels()

tls: rx: restore msg_iter before TLS 1.3 optimistic retry

veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment

xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom

dibs: initialise dibs->lock in dibs_dev_alloc()

net/x25: fix use-after-free of the socket by its timers