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Syself security assessment

CVE-2026-63978 in Syself Kubernetes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.

Syself Autopilot is fully managed Kubernetes on your own Hetzner servers. Every cluster runs a versioned cluster stack release, and this page tracks how CVE-2026-63978 affects the kernel component those releases ship, based on Syself's assessments. For the general description and scoring of the vulnerability, see the references.

Not affected in 1.36 v2 Upstream severity: Critical Last assessed

Syself Kubernetes is not affected by CVE-2026-63978 in any of the 2 releases that ship kernel.

Reason: The vulnerable code is never executed.

Our assessment in 1.36 v2, the newest release with this finding

kernel 6.18.42
Not affected Critical
The vulnerable code is never executed

Triggering this requires a pending in-kernel TLS handshake when a network namespace is torn down. The nodes run no service that starts kernel TLS handshakes, and workloads cannot create such requests, so the affected path is never exercised.

Syself Security

Status by release

ReleasesComponentStatusReasonFixed inAssessment
kernel 6.18.42Not affectedThe vulnerable code is never executed—Details

Frequently asked questions

My scanner reports CVE-2026-63978 in a Syself cluster. What should I do?

Scanners such as Trivy and Grype match package versions, so they report CVE-2026-63978 whenever the vulnerable version is present, even when it cannot be exploited. Syself publishes its assessments as a VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) document for every release. Pass it to your scanner to drop the findings Syself has assessed as not affected or fixed:

trivy image --vex hetzner-apalla-1-36-v2-advisory.openvex.json <image>
grype <image> --vex hetzner-apalla-1-36-v2-advisory.openvex.json

Each assessment applies to the package version it names. A finding stays in the report when the document has no assessment for that package, or when the vulnerability is still affected or under investigation.

Download the OpenVEX document for 1.36 v2

What do the statuses mean?

Not affected
The component ships in the release, but Syself has assessed that the vulnerability cannot be exploited there. The reason column says why.
Fixed
The release ships a version of the component that carries the fix.
Affected
The vulnerability can affect the release. Upgrade to a release listed as fixed once one is available.
Under Investigation
Syself is still assessing whether the vulnerability affects the release.

Why can the severity differ from other sources?

The severity shown is the upstream rating of the vulnerability itself. The status is Syself's assessment of whether it can be exploited in the components Syself ships, so a critical vulnerability can still be not affected.

References

Think this assessment is wrong, or found a vulnerability in Syself? Contact us.