Syself security assessment
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness within the table's node ID space. The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one failed add compounds into further duplicates. The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht->handle_idr is per hash table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes. The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure: it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(), allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same exhaustion check that the divisor path already has. Return an error so u32_change() fails with ENOSPC/ENOMEM when the node ID space is exhausted, and so u32_init() fails with -ENOMEM when the hash table ID space is exhausted. The extack message distinguishes pool exhaustion (-ENOSPC) from a transient allocation failure (-ENOMEM). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_CLS_U32=y (or =m with module loaded) - Create a clsact qdisc on a device, then add 4095 u32 filters with auto-generated handles to fill the node ID space for the root hash table (single bucket). The 4096th auto-handle filter add triggers the duplicate handle (fh 800::fff reused). Reachable at Level 2 (unshare -Urn, namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN). - For gen_new_htid: create 2047 u32 proto entries on the same block to fill the tp_c handle pool, then create one more. The root table gets handle 0 and aliases with other handle-0 root tables.
Syself Autopilot is fully managed Kubernetes on your own Hetzner servers. Every cluster runs a versioned cluster stack release, and this page tracks how CVE-2026-98104 affects the kernel component those releases ship, based on Syself's assessments. For the general description and scoring of the vulnerability, see the references.
Syself Kubernetes is not affected by CVE-2026-98104 in any of the 6 releases that ship kernel.
Reason: An attacker cannot reach the vulnerable code.
The defect needs many traffic-control filters to be added, which requires an elevated network privilege. Tenant workloads do not hold it and cannot manage host traffic control, so an adversary cannot reach the affected code.
Syself Security| Releases | Component | Status | Reason | Fixed in | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| kernel 6.18.42, 6.18.45, 6.18.49 | Not affected | An attacker cannot reach the vulnerable code | — | Details |
Scanners such as Trivy and Grype match package versions, so they report CVE-2026-98104 whenever the vulnerable version is present, even when it cannot be exploited. Syself publishes its assessments as a VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) document for every release. Pass it to your scanner to drop the findings Syself has assessed as not affected or fixed:
trivy image --vex hetzner-apalla-1-36-v6-advisory.openvex.json <image>
grype <image> --vex hetzner-apalla-1-36-v6-advisory.openvex.json Each assessment applies to the package version it names. A finding stays in the report when the document has no assessment for that package, or when the vulnerability is still affected or under investigation.
Download the OpenVEX document for 1.36 v6The severity shown is the upstream rating of the vulnerability itself. The status is Syself's assessment of whether it can be exploited in the components Syself ships, so a critical vulnerability can still be not affected.
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